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The New Men and the Universities
in East Africa
by Adam Kuper*
I. Modern Africa believes in salvation through education.
At the simplest level one finds the equation Education
Civilization = Christianity = Salvation, and in many
African languages the same word means both teacher
and priest, both attending school and attending church,
both learning and praying. At the very highest levels
of the state there is the same faith in the sacralizing
power of education. The political leader addresses
the party faithful in a neo-academic gown (often formal
party uniform), and takes as his proudest title the
doctorate bestowed by the Southern Baptist College.
With the coining of independence, there was a very general
hope that education would also deliver wealth, and
a widespread feeling that education legitimated the
new governments' leaders.
The fifties and sixties saw an extraordinary
expansion in Africa's educational systems, an expansion
powered by grass-root demand. In 1968, 84% of Africa's
population was illiterate, and this was still the highest
proportion in the world. However, between 1950 and 1966
the number of students in Africa had increased from
8 million to 27 million in primary education, from
million to 4 million in secondary education, and
from 71,000 to 334,000 in tertiary education. (1)
There is now a certain disillusionment in government
circles. Education is increasingly expensive, and
the goal of universal functional literacy has receded
* Adam Kuper is a lecturer in Social Anthropology
at University College, London.
(1) UNESCO &tatL6-tLcaL Yecvthoofz, 1969.
beyond the horizon. Moreover, there is little sign
that the investment has paid off in economic terms.
The educated are also the unemployed, and the University-
educated are employed by the government itself.
However, the individual who becomes educated is
not disenchanted. The goal in this game is sufficient
education to acquire money, status and power, which
means a job in the bureaucracy. Graduates in medicine
and agriculture aim at administrative jobs, for the
end of all education is a desk in a government office.
And while graduates are squeezed year after year into
already top-heavy bureaucracies, expatriates man the
secondary schools and up-country hospitals.
Kenya may stand as a typical example of what
the structure looks like. In Kenya 60% of the appropriate
age group are in the 7-year primary course. However
only 12% of primary school-leavers find places in official
secondary schools, and these schools cope with only
7% of the appropriate age-group in their 4-year pre-
sixth form progranmies. The bottle-necks into the sixth
form and then into the university are also very tight.
In Eastern Africa as a whole, in 1966, 0.2% of all students
were in universities, as against a world average of
4.67.. The absolute number of Kenyan university students
studying in East Africa today is under 3,000.
Thus the educational pyramid narrows very sharply
indeed. The mechanisms of selection along the route
are relative success in examinations and ability to
pay the fees. There are very few scholarships, and
fees are substantial when set against average incomes.
But there is another point to be noted about the pyramid:
the higher sections are substantially more costly than
the lower. The educational budget as a whole is often
as much as 20 to 25% of central government revenue in
Africa, and the universities take a large percentage
of this. In Kenya the handful of university students
consume 13% of the educational budget. In Nigeria it
was estimated before the civil war that the country's
5 universities cost as much as its 266 teachers' training
colleges or its 1,245 secondary schools. The universities
are favoured, and they are very expensive, partly because
they are residential and because they are highly dependent
on expatriate staff. The distinguished economist and
educationalist, W.A. Lewis, remarked scathingly, "African
educators ... have loaded on the backs of their tax-
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payers, who are among the poorest in the world, the
most expensive universities in the world outside North
America". (1)
The emphasis on the huge enterprise in education
is on these universities, which are of good international
standing, which cost fantastic sums in poor countries,
and which train a tiny minority ... For what? In East
Africa, at least, for government jobs. But since the
economy is comparatively stagnant, and few new jobs
are opening up (the expatriate officials are soon replaced)
new jobs to absorb graduates must often be created
on a Parkinsonian basis. Today one may find two or
three graduates in a small office doing one man's job,
having enjoyed a good education a huge cost to others
so that they may become an even greater drag on the
economy after graduation. One wonders today whether
the university exists to supply the bureaucracy, or
the bureaucracy to employ the graduates.
II. African education may be seen as a machine for
producing graduate bureaucrats. The rest are drop-
outs. The characteristics of the student body are
therefore of considerable interest, and this is a subject
which visiting sociologists have found easy to study,
with the help of captive student classes, and which
has been reported on from many parts of Africa. (2)
The picture is fairly consistent. The students come
from poor but above average backgrounds; and some
observers have already noted signs of elite closure.
They are westernized in clothes, recreations, religion
Cited by Godfrey, in his excellent paper "The
Economics of an African University", JowtktaL o Modetn
AÇ't..Lc.ai'i StLLctLe.4, 1966, vol.4 no.4, pp.435-55.
See e.g., Remi P. Clignet and Philip Foster,
"Potential elites in Ghana and the Ivory Coast: a preliminary
comparison", Ame)zLactn Jowtncl o Soc-Lo!ogj, Vol.70,
pp. 34962. J.E. Goldthorpe, "An African elite: a
sample survey of fifty-two former students of Makerere
College in East Africa", 8nLtLzh Jowuwi_ o Soc-Loogy,
1955, Vol. 6, pp. 31-47; Gustav Johoda, "The Social
Background of a West African Student Population". ßnLtÍ1.sk
Jowutc2 o SocLoILogíj, 1954, Vol. 5, pp. 355-65, Vol.
6, pp. 71-9; Pierre van den Berghe, "An African Elite
Revisited", Ma.wczzo, December 1968, Vol. 1, No. 4.
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and aspiration. And they overwhelmingly want to go
into safe civil service jobs and not into politics.
Their attitude to civil service versus political careers
is nicely summed up in a table (below) by Barkan. (1)
This illustrates the relationship between the students'
self-image and his image of politicians and civil servants
respectively.
The students are cynical about politics and concerned
with security - not only for themselves, but also for
all those who are dependent upon them. Many also believe
that the civil servant may be in a position to help
the country despite the "stupid" - i.e. comparatively
uneducated - politicians.
Stereotypes held by East African University Students
Cabinet Minister
Permanent Secretary
Self-Image
KENYA TANZANIA UGANDA
Opportunistic Opportunistic Opportunistic
Wasteful Ideo logical Wasteful
Subservient Subservient Proud
Intelligent
Reliable
E ffec t ive
Intelligent
Reliable
Honest
N = 121
Intelligent
Reliable
Honest
Intelligent
Reliable
Hones t
Intelligent
Reliable
Ef fictive
Intelligent
Reliable
Hones t
Generous
N=367 N=26O
Students do from time to time come into violent
conflict with governments in Africa, and I want to look
(1) Joel D. Barkan 1'What Makes the East African Student
Run?" Tn4LtLcn 1968, Vol. 7, No. VI, pp. 26-31. his
was the last edition of T'uzn4LtLokt to appear before
Obote arrested the editor. Speculation at the time
was that a contributdry cause of this action was the
advertisement for Barkan's piece on T)taki4LtLOt'4 cover
- a banner reading "Over 1200 E. African students think
Cabinet Ministers are OPPORTUNISTIC, WASTEFUL, PROUD
AND SUBSERVIENT".
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at the circumstances of these conflicts, for this problem
is crucial to my contention that African students are
to be viewed as a presumptive elite in a bureaucratic
state. For the conflict to occur with the governments
which will soon employ them, one of three conditions
must be met:
There must be a serious threat of unemployment.
This is particularly obvious in the French-speaking
states, where failure-rates in the universities are
high. The possibility of unemployment is thus brought
home to the student while he is still at the university.
The crisis in Kinshasa, where about 30 students were
killed on June 4, 1969, occurred against a background
where, in some faculties, 75 - 90Z of all students
were being failed in their examinations.U) In the
Anglophone universities, by contrast, as indeed in
England, it is virtually impossible to fail. Once
in, one can normally be assured of a degree. This
is a powerful spur to compliance.
The anticipation of elite status is frustrated -
the student is told he is not yet one of the privileged,
that he is a child and must take orders. This is so
violent a shock to the student, basking in his anticipated
elite status, that he is moved to react strongly. In
Dar-es-Salaam the students went on strike against a
government decision to make them do national service,
involving manual labour or periods of low remuneration
in bush stations. The Kenya students struck when
the government refused to allow them to invite Oginga
Odinga to speak to them and Kenyatta made a speach
stiginatising all "law-breakers", a category in which
he included "university students and their lecturers
who dabbled in politics ... prostitutes ... and non-
citizens".
These are great provocations to students, but the
interesting fact is that the government can coerce
them readily - because the students are mainly on government
grants and look forward to the realization of elite
status in government service. Thus in Kenya after
being humiliated, brutally assaulted by special troops
and rusticated, all the students who were permitted
to do so signed documents abasing themselves before
(1) Gearges H. Nzolgola, "Confrontation in Congo-
Kinshasa", Mc.wazo, December 1969, Vol.2, No.2.
the constituted authorities. (1)
3 The elite is differentiated and divided, and the
section out of power controls the university, which
is to a considerable extent run by local people. These
conditions are not met in most African states, but they
were in Sudan, where the university became the main
base for the coup which overthrew the military regime
in October 1964. (2) Ethiopia may yet supply a second
example, despite the fact that after the troubles of
1960 Haue Sellassie sent a message to the President
of the University College: "You are to teach three things.
Discipline and discipline and discipline". (3)
III. To review the main features of the situation:
Africa has an enormous awe for education; and it has
spent huge sums, considering its resources, on creating
western-type educational structures of high quality.
These are broad at the base and very narrow at the top,
but the greatest emphasis - financially and in publicity -
is placed on the pinnacle, the univeristy. The students
are committed to security and see themselves, correctly,
as embryo civil servants. The whole system is of doubtful
value in promoting economic growth, certainly when its
cost is weighed.
If this is correct, then the main function of
the entire educational structure, particularly the university,
is the creation of an elite. The function is to be
found in the product - the graduate who takes a government
job and earns more in a year (in the worn but still
shocking and accurate phrase) than a peasant or worker
earns in a lifetime. This consequence was naturally
anticipated by the Oxbridge-educated colonial planners,
but they saw nothing unacceptable in this, any more
than do most of their Makerere-educated successors.
See AÇizLcc Re.pon..t, March/April 1969, pp. 10-14,
"Kenya and Uganda : When does Dissent become Sedition?"
Robert W. Crawford, "Sudan: the Revolution of
October 1964", Mawctzo, December 1967, Vol.1. No. 2.
Richard Greenfield, EtkLopa, London : Pall
Mall Press, 1965, especially pp. 365-70, 414-16.
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A subsidiary function is to reconçile the non-
elite to the discrepancy in status and rewards by holding
out the possibility - to themselves or their children -
of becoming members of the elite through the apparently
merit-rewarding channels of education. The ideological
support for education (its putative link with develop-
ment, with Christianity, with spiritual power) serves
the saine purpose. It provides a charter for the status
of the elite, and legitimates this status both for the
elite and for the body of the population.
Note that changes in the content of education
(e.g. Africanization" of the syllabus) are of marginal
significance. The structure is the message. This presupposes
a model of the African state where the main cleavage
is between elite and masses, a model often proposed
but also often rejected. The objections to it are usually
reducible to one fundamental objection - that the crucial
cleavages are ethnic, and that this over-rides the horizontal
division. The member of the elite is loyal to his "tribe",
united by various ties with its poor members, and guided
by ancestral values as much as by the western values
which the elite appears to exemplify.
I consider these objections to be superficial.
There is evidence that the elite forms a unitary social
group in which ethnic ties are of secondary importance,
except when members of the elite rely upon ethnic support
in competition for scarce rewards open only to elite
members. (1) Ancestral values are unlikely to survive
16 formative years in boarding establishments organised
to inculcate very different values, and the product
of the educational system is, of course, not accepted
by the peasants as one of themselves. This point was
made movingly by Obote - " ... everywhere in Uganda,
if a secondary school-boy in particular, or even a University
graduate attempts to settle in the rural area and to
do what the mass of the people engaged in doing - farming -
whispers ascending to unspeakable innuendoes and songs
disparaging to the character of such a person, are all
a certainty. The parents, the clan, neighbours and
various others will begin to say 'So and so's son has
not got a job because of his character or because he
(1) See P.C. Lloyd, AÇiLct Ln SocLa2 Ckange., Penguin
Books, 1967, pp. 151-2; Introduction to The Ñet' EVteo
o. TtopíaL A'i..Lia, Oxford University Press, 1966.
has no brains'. So the educated lad flees from the
rural area and rushes to town .. .". (1)
My argument departs also from the more sophisticated
plural model, which derives historically from a consideration
of the colonial situation, and which posits differential
political incorporation on an ethnic basis as the fundamental
principle of the society. (2) This is a powerful model
for the analysis of colonial and settler states, but
it does not seem equally successful in the analysis
of post-colonial societies, where the elite is always
drawn from many indigenous ethnic groups, though one
may be dominant at any time. Nevertheless a consideration
of the colonial situation is necessary. There one had
to be white to rule - now one must be educated in the
western sense, i.e. as good as white.
I am not arguing a simple continuity with the
colonial social structure; the introduction of an indigenous
elite differentiated from the governed by education
rather than ethnic origin involves many changes in the
structure of society. For a number of reasons it releases
considerable creative forces, while at the same time
introducing a new and fundamental instability, because
the elite will always divide in political competition
for the scarce rewards. However, I am arguing that
this continuity is fundamental, and that the differences
depend on the mode of recruitment - education rather
than colour. My emphasis thus differs from those who
stress continuity with "traditional elites". This may
sometimes exist as a continuity of personnel; some
symbols may also be taken over; but the function of
the elite, its relationship to the governed, its mode
of recruitment and its life-style exhibit a more direct
continuity with the colonial elite. Soon Africa's elites
will be urban, educated, English and French speaking,
and largely self-perpetuating; while the mass of the
population will be poor, uneducated and disenfranchised
peasants, relying on ethnic patronage for any advantages.
See A. Milton Obote, "Policy Proposals for Uganda's
Educational Needs", Mauzo, December 1969, Vol. 2. No.
2. (p.4).
See especially J.S. Furnivall, CoPoLci PoLLcj
anid Pnctce: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands
India, Cambridge University Press, 1948; and Leo Kuper
and M.C. Smith (eds.). Peww2Lóm -Ln AÇ'uica, University
of California Press, 1969.
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Both classes, accepting the ideology of education will
accept the justice of the system, which is itself a
product (as they are) of the educational structure.
Only the emergence of large urban unemployed groups
with sorne education (but not enough)
I want to stress in conclusion that the features
I have noted are not peculiarly African. One is reminded
of Michael Young's prophetic book, Tke. IWe. o Tite.
Me.toc,uzcy, or, more directly, of many parallel tendencies
in Europe. It might be objected that there is a significant
difference, since elites in western countries are
functionally differentiated, while in Africa commerce
is in many countries predominantly in expatriate hands,
and the professions offer limited scope. This is true,
but seems less significant when one considers the growing
employment power of the super-corporations, with their
own quasi-civil services. Perhaps, in the pursuit of
equality of opportunity, the characteristic modern society
is everywhere creating the universal new elite of the
"educated". At the least, modern universities are now
the functional equivalents of the medieval church, less
successful, perhaps, as moral guides; as good, or better,
at arming the rulers with self-righteousness; and certainly
unequalled in handling the Julian Sorels.
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